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THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET FOR MBA QUALIFICATIONS 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the relationship between fees charged by MBA programmes and the number 
of applications to these programmes, using a panel dataset comprising universities from 
countries across the world. Using Three-Stage-Least-Squares methods for simultaneous 
equations, we find a two-way relationship between fees and applications: higher application 
numbers encourage universities to charge higher fees in the future, but higher fees in turn curtail 
application numbers. Of particular note are the results pertaining to additional explanatory 
variables that potentially represent MBA programme quality signals to applicants.  We find 
evidence that higher GMAT scores of existing students increase applications, as do higher post 
MBA salaries. Meanwhile, university and programme professional accreditations do not impact 
on student application choices, nor do alumni ratings of programme quality. Published MBA 
programme rankings appear to have little impact on applications, and where an effect can be 
identified, it appears that a better ranking discourages applications. 
 
 
JEL Classification: I21, D12.  
 




The MBA is a relatively new qualification: the first MBA programme was introduced by the 
Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration in 1908, while the first European MBA 
was introduced by INSEAD in 1957. The MBA education sector has expanded rapidly in the past 
40 years, as companies have sought to improve the training of their managers. On the employee 
side, an MBA has been seen as a way to open new career opportunities and as a means of 
personal development, primarily for students with pre-existing work experience (Ridgers, 2009). 
These are typically premium-fee programmes, with direct high costs of attending an MBA 
programme coupled with the opportunity cost of giving up full-time employment for the duration 




Fees vary considerably, both within as well as across countries. As a result, it is perhaps natural 
to question whether the MBA sector operates according to the market forces of demand and 
supply. At the most basic level, the question would be: ‘Do higher fees reduce demand, and does 
higher demand imply higher fees in the future?’ A more sophisticated version of this question 
would be: ‘What are the factors that influence the demand for places on MBA programmes – the 
quality of the institution, post-MBA salaries, alumni networks, or something else?’ This question 
is particularly important to ask, as, while there is already a large literature considering demand 
for undergraduate degree programmes, the literature considering demand for postgraduate 
qualifications, including MBAs, is very limited. 
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 Apart from full-time MBAs, there are Executive MBAs (EMBAs) which primarily involve evening and weekend 
classes and are generally taken by people who remain in full-time employment during the programme. This reduces 
the opportunity cost in financial terms for those on EMBAs; however, there remains the opportunity cost of time 




These questions are addressed in this paper. That is, we investigate the relationship between 
MBA fees and application numbers, as well as the impact of other factors that are believed to 
have a possible bearing on the decision regarding to which programmes to apply. The analysis 
uses a panel dataset of universities across the world, and simultaneous equations methods to 
identify a two-way relationship between fees and application numbers. Our main finding is that 
the MBA market does indeed operate according to the market forces of demand and supply: 
higher fees reduce the number of applications, whilst more applications in the previous year 
encourage universities to raise fees. Results are robust to the inclusion of additional variables in 
the model, as well as in a sub-sample of US-only institutions. Of particular note are the results 
pertaining to additional explanatory variables that potentially represent MBA programme quality 
signals to applicants.  We find evidence that higher GMAT scores of existing students increase 
applications, as do higher post MBA salaries. Meanwhile, university and programme 
professional accreditations do not impact on student application choices, nor do alumni ratings of 
programme quality. Published MBA programme rankings appear to have little impact on 
applications, and where an effect can be identified, it appears that a better ranking discourages 
applications. We hypothesize that this reflects weaker students being discouraged from applying 
to programmes that achieve better rankings. 
 
The next section provides a brief review of the related literature, showing how the present paper 
contributes to existing knowledge. Section 3 discusses the data, while Section 4 presents the 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This paper offers original contributions to two existing literatures, namely the literature on 
factors influencing higher education choices, and the literature on the determinants of university 
tuition fees. However, the analysis focuses on the MBA market which appears to have been 
somewhat neglected in the economics of education literature until recently. We speculate that 
this reflects a sparseness of suitable data, with the only data used to date being that collated by 
the Graduate Management Admissions Council (GMAC). This market is particularly valuable to 
understand, given the high costs associated with MBA study. The market for an MBA education 
is also interesting to analyze as it is international, with students often moving from their home 
country in order to undertake MBA studies. The limited existing literature on demand for an 
MBA qualification includes Montgomery (2002) who uses a nested logit model to examine the 
factors influencing US individuals’ choice of MBA school. Meanwhile Montgomery and Powell 
(2003) examine the post-MBA gender wage gap, and Arcidiacono et al. (2008), Grove and 
Hussey (2011a) estimate the financial returns of an MBA. Grove and Hussey (2011b) go onto 
consider the school and individual factors impacting on returns to an MBA, while Hussey 
(2011a) focuses specifically on the impact of MBA graduates’ ethics and MBA ethics training on 
returns to an MBA. Rather than focus on the financial returns to an MBA, Hussey (2011b) 
examines the impact of an MBA qualification on managerial position.  
 
Unlike these papers which all use individual alumnus survey data from GMAC, the current study 
instead focuses on institution level data from the Which MBA guide. Whilst the use of institution 
level data means that we lose some of the richness of the individual level data from GMAC, our 
dataset provides other information on variables such as university and programme accreditations, 
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and published programme rankings. Such variables enable us to address the questions posed in 
the introduction, providing an insight into the impact of quality indicators on demand for an 
MBA which can be considered to be an experience good.  
 
More generally, on the factors influencing students’ higher education decision choices, a number 
of issues have been addressed in the existing literature including the factors influencing the 
decision to attend university after school (Psacharopoulos and Soumelis (1979), Menon (1998)), 
and the decision to study overseas (Altbach (1991), Mazzarol (1998), Mazzarol and Soutar 
(2002), Nattavud (2005)). A number of recent papers consider the impact of published college 
rankings on US college applications, namely Griffith and Rask (2007), Bowman and Bastedo 
(2009) and Luca and Smith (2011), with Gunn and Hill (2008) considering the impact of 
university league tables on applications for undergraduate places in the UK. Meanwhile, Bezmen 
and Depken II (1998) focus on the impact of objectively measurable college characteristics on 
US undergraduate application rates.   
 
A number of papers already examine the impact of tuition fees on demand for a university 
education, with Blaug (1981) and Woodhall (1991) offering early analyses of the impact of fees 
in the UK on overseas student demand for higher education, and Leslie and Brinkman (1987), 
Savoca (1990), Heller (1997), and Cameron and Heckman (1999) offering US analyses, while 
Neill (2009) considers the Canadian market. Neill’s (2009) contribution is particularly valuable 
due to the instrumental variable approach adopted to take account of the endogeneity of fees, 
although Epple et al.’s (2006) simultaneous equation model of demand, financial aid, educational 
expenditure and outcomes must also be noted. However, while a number of studies have 
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examined the multiple factors influencing students’ university choices, including Elliott and Soo 
(2010) and Abbott and Leslie (2004), much of the existing literature focuses on undergraduate 
university choice. This paper expands the literature by instead examining the institution level 
factors influencing decisions to study for an MBA qualification.  
 
A separate strand of literature considers the factors that determine levels of university tuition 
fees. Numerous hedonic pricing models have been reported in academic literature across 
economics and management disciplines since Rosen’s (1974) and Lucas’s (1975) influential 
depiction of hedonic pricing methods. Traditionally, only objective factors that are expected to 
have a direct impact on prices were included as explanatory variables, although nowadays the 
term hedonic pricing model is sometimes used more loosely to denote models of objective as 
well as subjective factors influencing prices. Applications of the hedonic pricing model to the 
pricing of education continue to grow. An early example is Harford and Marcus’s (1986) 
analysis of undergraduate private college fees in the US. The literature has since been developed 
by Koshal et al. (1994); Koshal and Koshal (1998); Dimkpah et al. (2004); Schwartz and Scafidi 
(2004) and McMillen et al. (2007). However, with the exception of Schwartz and Scafidi (2004), 
who have a panel of five years duration, the literature to date focuses on cross sectional analyses, 
while Koshal and Koshal (1998) is notable for the estimation of a 2SLS model of the supply and 
demand factors influencing fees simultaneously. The remaining papers focus on a single 
equation model of the factors impacting on US undergraduate fees. Research has not uncovered 
any (hedonic) pricing models of MBA fees, despite the premium fees often set by institutions 
across the world. Consequently, this paper offers a number of contributions to the literature on 
the factors impacting on university fees. The paper offers an analysis of MBA tuition fees, both 
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in the US and across the world. Further, the panel data set is notable for the length of data used 
as well as the number of universities sampled. Finally, it is argued that the analysis is 
strengthened by the recognition that not only fees, but also demand for an MBA is endogenously 
determined, such that simultaneous equation methods are required.  
 
3. DATA 
The main data source is successive editions of the Which MBA Guide, published annually since 
1989 by The Economist. This contains information on MBA programmes, increasingly from 
countries across the world, although earlier editions focused on US and European programmes. 
Some data in the Guide are collected directly from each institution, for example data on fees, 
staff and student numbers, accreditations and the number of overseas placements available. 
However, since 1993, alumni have also been surveyed and aggregated responses are reported, 
allowing us to use variables that reflect alumni views of the programmes undertaken.  
 
The Which MBA guide has produced an overall ranking of the top MBA programmes since the 
2002 edition of the Guide. The ranking is constructed from a weighted average of the current and 
previous two years’ data (the weights are 50 percent for the current year, 30 percent for the year 
before, and 20 percent for two years before) to reduce the volatility in the rankings. The 
Financial Times (FT) has also produced a ranking of MBA programmes since 1999. Similar to 
the Which MBA rankings, the FT rankings are based on a weighted average of three years’ data 
(in this case, the weights are 50 percent for the current year, and 25 percent for each of the 
previous two years). These FT rankings have been added to the dataset, allowing an estimate of 
the impact of both sets of rankings on applications and fees to be made. Even if some students do 
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not read either the Which MBA guide or the FT rankings prior to selecting programmes to apply 
to, most students will be aware of the approximate position of a programme in the rankings as 




In the Which MBA Guide, monetary values are given in the domestic currency until 2006, after 
which US dollar values are reported. All monetary values from 2006 and before are converted 
into US dollars using the year-average exchange rates obtained from the International Financial 
Statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The resulting US dollar values are 
converted into real terms using the year-average Consumer Price Index (CPI) of each country, 
obtained from the World Economic Outlook database of the IMF.  
 
The final sample is an unbalanced panel, covering 17 years from 1994 to 2010 and 1249 
observations from 132 universities, with 582 observations from 53 universities in a sample 
restricted to US universities. Table 1 lists the number of observations and universities by country 
in our sample. As the data are from the Which MBA Guide, the observations relate to MBA 
programmes identified by that publication as the best quality MBA programmes, including, since 
2002,  the programmes that the guide ranks as amongst the top 100 in the world. Figure 1 shows 
that, for these programmes, there has been an increase in the number of applications per place 
over time. The GMAC annual Geographic Trend Report (2011) indicates that the average 
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 Other MBA programme rankings exist, including the Business Week and US News rankings as high profile 
alternatives. The US News ranks were not used in this paper as the focus is exclusively US-based, while the 
Business Week rankings are only published in full biannually, and do not include a combined World ranking, 
instead providing separate US and Rest of the World rankings. Nevertheless, using the 2010 rankings of each of the 
four publications, the correlation between each pair of rankings was never lower than 0.73, suggesting confidence in 
the Which MBA Guide and FT rankings used. 
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number of reports sent per candidate of the GMAT test has remained fairly constant at 2.9 to 3.0 
reports between 2000 and 2010, so the majority of the increase in applications shown in Figure 1 
may be attributed to an increase in the number of applicants rather than an increase in the 
number of applications per applicant. This increase in demand is also reflected in increasing fees 
over time, as shown in Figure 2. This figure also shows that post-MBA starting salaries have 
been rising over time, and further that in recent years these salaries have exceeded average US 
salary levels that are shown on Figure 2 for comparison purposes. Simultaneously, there is 
evidence of higher quality MBA students as can also be seen in Figures 3 and 4, which document 
an increase in the average GMAT scores and average months of previous work experience of 
students on these programmes.  
 
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics of the variables used in the basic econometric 
specification. “Overall” refers to the overall mean and standard deviation of the sample; 
“between” refers to the difference between the means of each university; “within” refers to the 
variation within each university over time. Table 2 shows that there is a large amount of 
variation both within and between universities in all variables. In addition, compared to non-US 
universities, US universities charge higher real fees, have more applications per place, occupy 
lower ranks in both the Which MBA guide and the FT rankings (indicating higher quality), and 
have students with higher average GMAT scores and less work experience. However, there is no 






4. ECONOMETRIC METHODS 
We estimate a system of two simultaneous equations, one of fees, the other for applications, as a 
function of several explanatory variables. Since our main objective is to determine whether or 
not there exists a market mechanism in the MBA sector, our baseline specification is the 
following:  
 
                                                                       (1) 
                                                                       (2) 
 
where     and     are university-specific effects, and     and     are time-specific effects. Time-
invariant university-specific effects may include university reputation, while time-specific effects 
may include the recession of 2008-09 which may be expected to impact on all universities in the 
sector. Equation (1) states that (real) fees
34
 charged by university i in year t are determined by the 
natural log of the applications ratio (number of applications divided by number of places
5
) in the 
previous year, the average GMAT score in the previous year, time- and university-specific 
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 In additional sensitivity checks we also use the university’s real fees relative to the fees charged by other 
universities in the same country (or region in the US), to capture the idea that universities may set their fees 
depending on what their local rivals do. The regression results using this alternative measure of fees are qualitatively 
similar to the results reported below for real fees.  
4
 We have also experimented with using the natural log of fees in equations (1) and (2); however, the results were 
much weaker than when fees are included linearly as in equations (1) and (2). This suggests that including fees in 
levels rather than in logs is the preferred functional form for this system of equations.   
5
 We use the applications ratio instead of applications, since the applications ratio captures the excess demand for 
places. Larger MBA programmes may be expected to have more applications, ceteris paribus, so using the 
applications ratio controls for this effect. In addition, the coefficient of variation within each university over time is 
much lower for intake than for total applications (0.355 compared to 0.903), so that much of the variation in 
applications per place within universities over time is due to changes in applications rather than changes in intake.   
12 
 
effects, and an error term. Similarly, equation (2) states that the natural log of the ratio of 
applications to places in university i in year t are determined by real fees in the current year, 
average GMAT in the previous year, time- and university-specific effects, and an error term.  
 
If MBA fee-setting responds to the market forces of demand in the form of the number of 
applications, and if demand responds to the market forces of price in the form of fees, then 
equations (1) and (2) will be simultaneously determined, and we would expect       and 
     ; that is, higher applications in the previous year should encourage universities to charge 
higher fees in the current year, while higher fees in the current year should restrict applications in 
the current year. The Average GMAT score proxies for the quality of the student body; a higher 
average GMAT score would imply higher quality students and hence the possibility of charging 
higher fees for what may be expected to be a better quality product. Reflecting this,     should 
be positive. On the applications side, higher average GMAT scores may encourage applications 
by signalling the quality of the programme, or may discourage applications by posing too high a 
barrier for potential applicants. Many institutions have on their websites a section detailing the 
average GMAT scores obtained by previous cohorts of students, so this information is readily 
available to prospective applicants. The inclusion of both time and university-specific effects 
means that the coefficients are identified from changes in the variables for each university over 
time.  
 
We take the first differences of equations (1) and (2) to eliminate the university-specific effects. 




                                                                    
                                                                   
 
where Δ is the first difference operator. Since having first differenced time dummies is 
inconvenient (see Wooldridge, 2003 for a discussion), we estimate the first-differenced equations 
with time dummies in levels, as follows:  
 
                                                                        (3) 
                                                                       (4) 
 
Equations (3) and (4) are estimated simultaneously using Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) 
estimation
6
. Fees and application ratios are both endogenous, so instrumented values of both 
variables are obtained. To help identify the two equations, we include two additional instruments 
which are not part of equations (3) and (4): these are the twice-lagged fees and application ratios, 
in levels. This follows the Anderson-Hsiao (1981) method of instrumenting variables in 
differences with the respective lags in levels; Anderson and Hsiao (1981) show that this yields 
consistent estimates in a dynamic 2SLS model
7
. Later in our results tables we report the F-
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 A key assumption is that       and       are uncorrelated over time, for the standard errors to be valid under first-
differencing. We test the residuals from the regressions for serial correlation, and find evidence of negative serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals. Therefore, the usual OLS standard errors may not greatly understate the 
correct standard errors (see Wooldridge, 2003 for discussion).  
7
 It is possible to substitute the one-period lag of equation (4) into equation (3) and write it as the change in fees as a 
function of lagged change in fees, eliminating the applications ratio from the model. Doing this yields the expected 
negative coefficient on the lagged change in fees; this coefficient is less than 1, which suggests that this year’s 
change in fees may be partly in response to the previous year’s change; in particular, that it represents a partial 
adjustment to the previous year’s change.  
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statistic of these two additional instruments in the first stage regressions; they are always highly 
significant, suggesting that they are strongly correlated with the instrumented variables.  
 
We performed the Fisher-type panel-unit-root test on the main variables in equations (3) and (4): 
fees, the natural log of the applications ratio, and the average GMAT score, all in first 
differences. The highly unbalanced nature of our panel and the presence of gaps in the data 
prevent us from performing other panel-unit-root tests. The null hypothesis is that all panels 
contain a unit root, while the alternative is that at least one panel is stationary. The test rejects the 
null hypothesis for each variable at every conventional significance level, which suggests that 
our data does not have unit roots in every panel.  
 
In addition to the basic specification estimated in equations (3) and (4), the results of which are 
reported in Section 5.1 below, we also estimate models which include additional control 
variables to test the robustness of the results. These results are discussed in Section 5.2. We also 
compare our results with results estimated with OLS separately for the two equations, ignoring 
the simultaneity; these results are reported in Section 5.3. Finally, whilst our main sample 
includes universities from many countries, around 40 percent of our sample comes from the US. 
It may be argued that the US market for MBAs is more unified than the global market, and also 
that our US sample covers a larger fraction of the US market than our global sample covers of 
the global market (for example, there is only one Japanese university in the sample: the 
International University of Japan). Therefore, in Section 5.4 we limit the sample to only US 





This section reports the regression results using the methods detailed above. All regressions 
reported are in first differences, with time-specific effects.  
 
5.1. Fees, applications and rankings 
In this section we report the results of the baseline specifications (3) and (4), relating MBA fees, 
the applications ratio and average GMAT scores. These results are reported in columns (1) and 
(2) of Table 3. The applications ratio has a significantly positive effect on fees in the coming 
year; that is, higher applications-to-places increases the fees charged. On the other hand, fees 
have a negative effect on the applications ratio; higher fees reduce the number of applications per 
available place. Taken together, we see this result as providing evidence that the market 
mechanism operates in this sector: higher prices discourage demand, whilst higher demand in the 
previous year encourages firms to increase current prices.
8
 The average GMAT score has no 
significant effect on fees, but has a significantly positive effect on applications. This indicates 
that universities do not take into account the academic abilities of their students in deciding on 
fee changes, but that applicants are attracted by higher GMAT scores in the past. Any degree 
could be considered to be an experience good, for which applicants cannot obtain full 
information in advance of choosing a university. Given the premium fees typically charged for 
MBAs and the opportunity cost in terms of forgone salaries of studying for a full-time MBA, 
applicants may be expected to consider carefully their application choices; the quality of 
previous students appears to be used as a signal of degree quality.   
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 If the market mechanism works effectively, then prices should be observed to fall as well as rise, depending on 
market conditions. In the dataset, we observe 297 occurrences of nominal fee decreases, and once we convert fees 




Columns (3) to (6) of Table 3 include two different measures of the ranking of MBAs. If this 
sector behaves like a market for an experience good, and if MBA rankings signal the (true or 
perceived) quality of the programme, then a change in the MBA ranking would reflect changes 
in the quality of the programme, as distinct from time-invariant reputation which would be 
eliminated by the first-differencing. We may expect that higher-quality programmes may attract 
more applicants for each available place, controlling for prices and entry standards. This idea is 
tested in columns (3) to (6) of Table 3. First, in columns (3) and (4), we use the ranking produced 
by the Which MBA guide published annually by the Economist. MBA rankings are available 
from this source starting in 2002. We find that the Which MBA guide ranking has no significant 
impact on either the fee charged or the applications ratio. The results for the other variables 
remain qualitatively similar to those in columns (1) and (2).  
 
Although the Which MBA guide is the main source of the data used in this paper, it remains an 
open question as to whether other MBA rankings are more influential in the sector. We therefore 
consider the rankings published by the Financial Times. In columns (5) and (6), we use the 
Financial Times MBA rankings, starting from the year 1999. We find that the Financial Times 
ranking has no significant impact on the fee charged, but has a significantly positive effect on the 
application ratio. This indicates that higher rank (lower quality) increases applications, which 
seems puzzling. It may be that a university that moves up the league table discourages 
speculative applications from less-able students. It is also possible that this is the result of a 
sample selection problem since not all the universities in the Which MBA guide are in the 
17 
 





The conclusion that published rankings have little effect on MBA applications contrasts with the 
prevalent result in the rest of the literature. Griffith and Rask (2007), Bowman and Bastedo 
(2009) and Luca and Smith (2011) all identify a significant, positive impact of improvements in 
published ranking position on US undergraduate applications, with this effect more marked for 
top ranked US colleges. Consequently, the analysis below considers whether alternative factors 
instead affect MBA programme applications.  
 
5.2. Robustness to additional control variables 
In this section we check the robustness of our main result, that is, the relationship between fees 
and applications, to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables that may impact on fees and 
applications. Data for these additional variables are obtained from the Which MBA guide, and 
the results of the regressions including these additional variables are reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
For ease of exposition we group these additional variables into four groups: student 
characteristics, professional accreditations, faculty characteristics, and student perceptions. As 
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 Using the natural log of rank instead of rank in levels yields almost identical results to those reported in Table 3.  
10
 In unreported results we also include (real) application fees in first differences as an additional explanatory 
variable in both equations. This is motivated by the idea that application fees may reduce the number of speculative 
applications, and in so doing, may reduce the cost of administering a programme, hence possibly leading to lower 




The first group of additional variables, student characteristics, includes the average work 
experience of students in the programme, the average real salary in US dollars obtained by 
graduates from the programme, the average age of students, and the percentage of female and 
foreign students. The results of including these variables are in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4. 
We find that higher post-MBA salaries increase both fees and the applications ratio. This is as 
we may expect; higher post-MBA salaries may increase the attractiveness of the programme and 
hence raise demand, increasing both price and quantity demanded
11
. There is weak evidence that 
a higher percentage of female students reduces the applications ratio, which may suggest that 
women make fewer applications. The results on fees and applications remain the same as before: 
higher fees discourage applications, whilst higher applications encourage higher fees in future.   
 
The second group of additional variables, professional accreditations, reflect the growing 
importance of quality assurance as the number of MBA programmes has increased globally. 
Professional accreditation may be viewed as another signal of quality; this may be expected to 
increase both fees and applications. We use a set of three dummy variables for whether or not a 
programme/business school is accredited by the three main business school accreditation bodies: 
AACSB (Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business), EQUIS (European Quality 
Improvement System), and AMBA (Association of MBAs). Although EQUIS is a European 
body, EQUIS accreditation is not restricted to European schools. As with other variables, in the 
reported results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 we use the change in the dummy variable 
(reflecting attainment or loss of accreditation) as the explanatory variable in the regression; using 
                                                          
11
 Data is also available on the percentage increase in salaries post-MBA. This has no significant effect on either fees 
or applications, and limited data availability means that we lose over half the sample when including this variable, 
so we do not report these results in the tables.  
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the accreditation dummy in levels does not change the results, nor does adding the dummies in 
levels or first differences to reflect a measure of “total accreditation”. We also experimented with 
interacting the accreditation dummies with continent dummies to reflect the regional orientation 
of the accreditation bodies, and these interactions also do not have any significant impact on fees 
or applications. In all cases, accreditation has no significant impact on either applications or fees, 
and inclusion of the accreditation dummies does not change the basic relationship between 
applications and fees. What this suggests is that professional accreditation may not be very 
important to students in the MBA market, although Hussey (2011b) concludes that AACSB 
accreditation is associated with higher returns to an MBA qualification in the US.  
 
The third group of additional variables is the characteristics of the faculty of an MBA 
programme. It may be hypothesized that superior faculty either in terms of research reputation or 
teaching quality may be prized by students, thus raising demand and hence applications and fees. 
We use three variables: the percentage of faculty with PhDs, student evaluation of the quality of 
the faculty, and the ratio of faculty to students. This last variable is potentially subject to severe 
measurement error, as although universities report the number of faculty involved in the MBA 
programme, the intensity of involvement may be quite different across universities, or even 
within the same university over time. Hence the results reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 
5 should be interpreted with caution. The only faculty variable that is marginally significant is 
the ratio of faculty to students, suggesting that a higher ratio of faculty to students discourages 
applications. However, as noted above this variable is measured with error, so the implications of 
this result are not clear. In any case, the basic results relating applications to fees remain 
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unchanged from the previous results, and the results are robust to the exclusion of the ratio of 
faculty to students variable.  
 
The fourth group of additional variables reflect student perception of the programme undertaken. 
Current students and alumni who graduated in the last three years were surveyed by the Which 
MBA guide on various aspects of the programme. We use the student perceptions of the quality 
of facilities, the careers services, student perception of the culture and their classmates, and the 
overall student perception of the programme. The results are reported in columns (3) and (4) of 
Table 5. We find that none of the student perceptions have any significant effect on either fees or 
applications. Note that this result (and the previous results) of mostly insignificant covariates is 
probably not driven by multicollinearity, since all variables used are in first differences. Even 
though some of the variables are highly correlated with each other in levels, the largest 
correlation between the additional variables in first differences is 0.57, with the majority of 
correlations less than 0.2. Once again the relationship between fees and applications is obtained. 
We therefore conclude that neither fees nor applications are influenced by perceptions of current 
and previous students; this is an interesting result, since the nature of education as an experience 
good (Nelson 1970) would have suggested that prospective students would place at least some 
weight on the perceptions of previous students.  
 
 
5.3. Comparison with OLS results 
Our use of 3SLS techniques has been justified on the basis of the idea that both fees and 
applications are determined simultaneously, and that failing to take this simultaneity into account 
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would result in biased estimates. In this section we test whether this is indeed the case, and 
compare the previous results with results from OLS estimation of each equation separately. The 
results are reported in Table 6, where we report the results of estimating our baseline equations 
(3) and (4) without any additional controls. This enables a direct comparison with columns (1) 
and (2) of Table 3.  
 
In column (1) of Table 6, we find that, using OLS, there is no significant effect of either the 
application ratio or the average GMAT on fees; this is different from the 3SLS result in which 
the application ratio has a robustly positive effect on fees. In column (2), average GMAT has no 
significant effect on the application ratio, but fees have a positive relationship with applications. 
Once again this result is different from that obtained by 3SLS, in which controlling for the 
endogeneity of fees results in a robustly negative relationship between fees and applications. 
These differences in results between OLS and 3SLS may be attributed to the simultaneity bias 
which is not taken into account with OLS estimation.  
 
Table 6 also reports the results of a test of the endogeneity of fees in the applications equation, 
and applications in the fee equation. The null hypothesis for this test is that the variable in 
question is exogenous. The test statistic is distributed as chi-squared, and is defined as the 
difference in the Sargan-Hansen statistics between the equation in which the variable in question 
is assumed to be endogenous, and the equation in which the variable in question is assumed to be 
exogenous (see Baum et. al., 2007 for more details). We find that fees are endogenous to 
applications, while applications are not endogenous to fees. Nevertheless, the endogeneity of 
fees in the applications equation appears to be sufficient to bias the OLS results of both 
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equations. Therefore, the results of Table 6 provide evidence to support our use of 3SLS methods 
to correct for this endogeneity bias.   
 
5.4. Results for US sample 
The results in the previous section have been based on all available universities in the Which 
MBA guide. As shown in Table 2, these universities are located in many different countries. This 
highlights the internationalisation of the MBA market. However, at the same time, our sample 
only consists of a small fraction of the total global MBA market. Therefore we may not be able 
to capture a more complete picture of this market. In this section we adopt a different approach; 
we take US MBA programmes as our sample. By doing so, we may have a more unified market, 
in the sense that a potential applicant may see this market as a unified whole, and at the same 
time, universities in the US are more likely to regard other US universities as their competitors. 
Also, our sample consists of a relatively large number of US universities; therefore we may be 
more confident that we have included the majority of the most important MBA programmes in 
the US.  
 
Using the US sample, we replicate the foregoing analysis. For brevity we report only the 
analogue of Table 3, our baseline specification plus rankings, in Table 7. We find broadly the 
same results as when we use the World sample
12
. That is, higher MBA fees are associated with a 
lower applications-to-places ratio, while higher applications in the previous year result in higher 
fees in the current year. In the US sample, unlike in the World sample, average GMAT score has 
                                                          
12
 We also obtain similar results to the World sample when we use the US sample with the additional control 




no significant impact on either applications or fees. Similarly, MBA rankings, whether measured 
by the Which MBA guide or the Financial Times, have no significant effect on either variable. 
As before, we interpret our results as saying that market forces of supply and demand operate in 
the MBA sector. However, in the US, neither universities nor applicants are influenced by 
rankings, or by information on the quality of current students, whereas such information has 
some influence in the world as a whole.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The main focus of this paper is to investigate the relationship between MBA fees and 
applications, using a sample of MBA programmes across the world from 1994 to 2010. To take 
into account the simultaneous determination of fees and applications, we estimate a two-equation 
model using 3SLS methods. We find that higher fees result in fewer applications per place, while 
higher applications per place result in higher fees in future. We interpret this result as saying that 
the MBA sector operates based on market forces of demand and supply; that higher demand for 
places leads universities to charge higher prices, while, conversely, higher prices choke off 
demand. These findings are robust to controlling for other explanatory variables including 
published programme rankings, student and faculty characteristics, student perceptions, and 
professional accreditations, and for a subsample of US universities. We also show that ignoring 
the simultaneity and estimating the two equations using OLS leads to different results, which we 
attribute to simultaneity bias.  
 
Our results are obtained by estimating the equations in first differences. This means that any 
time-invariant university effects cannot be estimated. However, Ridgers (2009) reports that, in a 
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survey of MBA students, the reputation of the school was the most important factor in choosing 
an MBA programme. If reputation (as distinct from rankings) does not change rapidly, then it 
may be regarded as a university fixed effect, and hence our methodology means that we would 
not be able to estimate the effect of reputation on fees or applications, even if we were able to 
obtain such a measure. Future research therefore could adopt alternative estimation methods and 
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Figure 1: Average MBA applications to places ratio over time   
 
Source: Which MBA Guides 
 
Figure 2: Average real fees and post MBA starting salaries 
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Figure 3: Average GMAT scores over time 
 
Source: Which MBA Guides 
 
Figure 4: Average months of previous work experience 
 



































Table 1: Number of observations and universities by country.  
Country Observations Universities 
Australia 38 5 
Belgium 17 4 
Canada 50 9 
China 8 1 
Finland 11 1 
France 70 8 
Germany 1 1 
Hong Kong 31 3 
Ireland 24 2 
Italy 11 1 
Japan 6 1 
Mexico 2 1 
Monaco 13 1 
Netherlands 37 3 
New Zealand 10 1 
Norway 15 2 
Singapore 13 2 
Spain 54 4 
Switzerland 13 1 
UK 243 28 
US 582 53 











World sample excluding US 
Variable 
 
Mean Std Dev Observations 
 
Mean Std Dev Observations 
 
Mean Std Dev Observations 
             Real fees (000 
US$) 
overall 35.47 17.62 N =    1249 
 
46.76* 15.59 N =     582 
 
25.61 12.69 N =     667 
between 
 
15.52 n =     132 
  
11.93 n =      53 
  




9.29 T-bar = 9.46 
  
10.25 T-bar = 10.98 
  
8.37 T-bar = 8.44 
             Application 
ratio 
overall 6.237 4.84 N =    1249 
 
7.05* 3.29 N =     582 
 
5.53 5.78 N =     667 
between 
 
3.66 n =     132 
  
2.70 n =      53 
  




3.51 T-bar = 9.46 
  
1.76 T-bar = 10.98 
  
4.52 T-bar = 8.44 
             Which MBA 
rank 
overall 48.00 28.31 N =     637 
 
41.75* 26.29 N =     321 
 
54.35 28.92 N =     316 
between 
 
27.51 n =     110 
  
25.79 n =      49 
  




11.85 T-bar = 5.79 
  
9.70 T-bar = 6.55 
  
13.71 T-bar = 5.18 
             Financial 
Times rank 
overall 43.28 26.91 N =     704 
 
38.94* 25.17 N =     391 
 
48.72 28.04 N =     313 
between 
 
26.98 n =     104 
  
24.61 n =      50 
  




11.56 T-bar = 6.77 
  
9.89 T-bar = 7.82 
  
13.37 T-bar =  5.79 
             Average 
GMAT 
overall 634.9 41.77 N =    1201 
 
654.5* 36.88 N =     572 
 
617.1 37.85 N =     629 
between 
 
37.96 n =     129 
  
32.46 n =      53 
  




21.79 T-bar = 9.31 
  
20.92 T-bar = 10.79 
  
22.57 T-bar = 8.28 
             Real post-
MBA salary 
(000 US$) 
overall 72.07 19.11 N =    1123 
 
71.73 12.51 N =     567 
 
72.41 24.06 N =     556 
between 
 
16.96 n =     124 
  
10.31 n =      53 
  
20.62 n =      71 
within 
 
11.02 T-bar = 9.06 
  
7.31 T-bar = 10.69 
  
13.82 T-bar = 7.83 
             Previous work 
experience 
(months) 
overall 63.64 20.43 N =    1234 
 
53.49* 9.78 N =     577 
 
72.55 23.03 N =     657 
between 
 
19.13 n =     131 
  
7.15 n =      53 
  
21.34 n =      78 
within 
 
10.35 T-bar = 9.42 
  
7.55 T-bar = 10.89 
  
12.30 T-bar = 8.42 




Table 3: Regression results: Fees, applications and rankings 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  
 D Real fees D lnAppRatio D Real fees D lnAppRatio D Real fees D lnAppRatio 
LD log application ratio 1.577  2.044  1.974  
(0.173)***  (0.448)***  (0.459)***  
LD average GMAT 0.010 0.004 -0.005 0.005 0.010 0.004 
(0.008) (0.001)*** (0.018) (0.002)** (0.020) (0.002)* 
D real fees  -0.259  -0.102  -0.140 
  (0.020)***  (0.029)***  (0.018)*** 
LD rank   -0.027 -0.001   
   (0.020) (0.002)   
LD FT rank     0.022 0.005 
     (0.019) (0.002)** 
       
Eq F-stat 9.11*** 10.33*** 6.06*** 4.16*** 4.63*** 6.60*** 
F-stat excluded instruments 8.32*** 40.01*** 4.08** 21.63*** 7.15*** 27.04*** 
Time period 1994-2010 1994-2010 2004-2010 2004-2010 2001-2010 2001-2010 
Universities 132 132 102 102 91 91 
N 1,249 1,249 488 488 551 551 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All variables are in first differences, and all regressions 
include time-specific effects. Each pair of equations (Real fees and log application ratio) is estimated simultaneously using 3SLS. D 
denotes the first difference operator, and L denotes the first lag operator. F-stat excluded instruments is the F-statistic of the test of the 





Table 4: Regression results: Additional controls 1: Student characteristics and accreditation. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
 D Real fees D lnAppRatio D Real fees D lnAppRatio 
LD log application to intake ratio 1.607  2.160  
 (0.192)***  (0.377)***  
LD average GMAT 0.007 0.003 0.013 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.002)** (0.018) (0.003)** 
LD average work experience -0.006 0.001   
 (0.014) (0.002)   
LD real salary 0.082 0.024   
 (0.015)*** (0.003)***   
LD average age 0.152 0.035   
 (0.151) (0.025)   
LD percentage of women students -0.011 -0.006   
 (0.023) (0.004)*   
LD percentage of foreign students 0.001 -0.000   
 (0.012) (0.002)   
LD real fees  -0.258  -0.165 
  (0.021)***  (0.037)*** 
LD AACSB membership   -2.117 -0.246 
   (1.641) (0.244) 
LD AMBA membership   1.654 0.248 
   (2.726) (0.388) 
LD EQUIS membership   1.342 0.309 
   (1.801) (0.256) 
Eq F-stat 7.10*** 7.30*** 5.46*** 2.96*** 
F-stat excluded instruments 6.97*** 31.68*** 2.85* 15.38*** 
Time period 1994-2010 1994-2010 2006-2010 2006-2010 
Universities 122 122 105 105 
N 1,027 1,027 405 405 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All variables are in first 
differences, and all regressions include time-specific effects. Each pair of equations (Real fees 
and log application ratio) is estimated simultaneously using 3SLS. D denotes the first difference 
operator, and L denotes the first lag operator. F-stat excluded instruments is the F-statistic of the 
test of the joint significance of the two additional instruments used in identifying the system; see 
the text for further details. 
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Table 5: Regression results: Additional controls 2: Faculty characteristics and student 
perceptions 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
 D Real fees D lnAppRatio D Real fees D lnAppRatio 
LD log application to intake ratio 2.126  1.701  
 (0.376)***  (0.193)***  
LD average GMAT 0.015 0.006 0.009 0.004 
 (0.018) (0.003)** (0.010) (0.002)** 
LD real fees  -0.169  -0.241 
  (0.038)***  (0.018)*** 
LD percentage of PhDs in faculty 0.015 0.003   
 (0.032) (0.005)   
LD student evaluation of faculty -2.259 -0.242   
 (1.427) (0.224)   
LD faculty per student -0.629 -0.128   
 (0.500) (0.075)*   
LD student perception of facilities   -0.486 -0.206 
   (0.893) (0.144) 
LD student perception of careers 
services 
  0.042 0.046 
  (0.471) (0.076) 
LD student perception of the 
programme 
  -0.337 -0.060 
  (0.959) (0.155) 
LD student perception of culture 
and classmates 
  0.062 0.057 
  (0.875) (0.141) 
Eq F-stat 5.42*** 2.99*** 6.21*** 8.71*** 
F-stat excluded instruments 2.58* 15.24*** 9.01*** 32.81*** 
Time period 2006-2010 2006-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 
Universities 102 102 122 122 
N 399 399 1,100 1,100 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All variables are in first 
differences, and all regressions include time-specific effects. Each pair of equations (Real fees 
and log application ratio) is estimated simultaneously using 3SLS. D denotes the first difference 
operator, and L denotes the first lag operator. F-stat excluded instruments is the F-statistic of the 
test of the joint significance of the two additional instruments used in identifying the system; see 




Table 6: Separate OLS regressions of both dependent variables.  
 (1)  (2)  
 D Real fees D lnAppRatio 
LD log application to intake ratio 0.321  
 (0.422)  
LD average GMAT 0.009 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.001) 
LD real fees  0.006 
  (0.002)** 
R
2
 0.06 0.05 
Time period 1994-2010 1994-2010 
Universities 132 132 
N 1,249 1,249 
Test endogeneity  4.67  0.30 
P-value 0.031 0.583 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All variables are in first 
differences, and all regressions include time-specific effects. Each equation is estimated 
separately using OLS, with standard errors clustered by university. D denotes the first difference 
operator, and L denotes the first lag operator. The test for endogeneity is a test of the null 
hypothesis that the application ratio in the fee equation and real fees in the application ratio 
equation are exogenous. P-value is the p-value of this test. See Baum et al (2007) for details of 
this test.   
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Table 7: Fees, applications and rankings: US sample.  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  
 D Real fees D lnAppRatio D Real fees D lnAppRatio D Real fees D lnAppRatio 
LD log application ratio 3.023  3.035  3.746  
(0.375)***  (0.531)***  (0.701)***  
LD average GMAT -0.005 -0.000 -0.024 -0.002 0.001 0.002 
(0.019) (0.002) (0.039) (0.004) (0.029) (0.002) 
LD real fees  -0.161  -0.158  -0.093 
  (0.013)***  (0.015)***  (0.014)*** 
LD rank   -0.025 0.001   
   (0.037) (0.004)   
LD FT rank     0.005 0.002 
     (0.026) (0.002) 
LD relative fees       
      
Eq F-stat 5.61*** 8.76*** 6.19*** 13.85*** 4.55*** 5.75*** 
F-stat excluded instruments 11.00*** 26.11*** 4.22** 15.12*** 7.56*** 13.84*** 
Time period 1994-2010 1994-2010 2004-2010 2004-2010 2001-2010 2001-2010 
Universities 53 53 50 50 48 48 
N 582 582 251 251 318 318 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All variables are in first differences, and all regressions 
include time-specific effects. Each pair of equations (Real fees and log application ratio) is estimated simultaneously using 3SLS. D 
denotes the first difference operator, and L denotes the first lag operator. F-stat excluded instruments is the F-statistic of the test of the 
joint significance of the two additional instruments used in identifying the system; see the text for further details. 
 
 
 
